WORKING PAPERS

Bidding to Give in the Field: Door-to-Door Fundraisers Had it Right from the Start (with Arthur Schram and Adriaan Soetevent)

Power and the Privilege of Clarity: An Analysis of Bargaining Power and Information Transmission (with Adrian de Groot Ruiz and Theo Offerman)

An Experimental Study of Credible Deviations and ACDC (with Adrian de Groot Ruiz and Theo Offerman)

Equilibrium Selection in Cheap Talk Games: ACDC Rocks when Other Criteria Remain Silent (with Adrian de Groot Ruiz and Theo Offerman)

Keeping Out Trojan Horses: Auctions and Bankruptcy in the Laboratory (with Ailko van der Veen)

Inverse Adverse Selection: The Market for Gems (with Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci and Francesco Parisi)

Collusion and the Choice of Auction: An Experimental Study (with Jeroen Hinloopen)

Going Once, Going Twice, Reported! Cartel Activity and the Effectiveness of Leniency Programs in Experimental Auctions (with Jeroen Hinloopen)

Auctioning Incentive Contracts: An Experimental Study (with Arthur van de Meerendonk)

Punching above One's Weight: The Case against Election Campaigns (with Marco Haan, Bart Los, and Eko Riyanto)

WORK IN PROGRESS

When Would a Lawyer Work for a Fixed Fee? (with Flóra Felsö and Jo Seldeslachts))

Inequity Aversion Tests (with Yang Yang and Arthur Schram)